Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2013

Guidance from Vaccination Jurisprudence
Michael Ulrich
Boston University School of Public Health

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Ulrich, Guidance from Vaccination Jurisprudence , in 13 American Journal of Bioethics 40 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1183

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

GUIDANCE FROM VACCINATION JURISPRUDENCE
Michael R. Ulrich, J.D., M.P.H.
Antommaria (2013) steps outside of traditional ethical analysis for compulsory
vaccination programs for health care personnel (HCP) by utilizing an ethics framework
for public health to provide a broader examination of justification not only for obligations
but implementation as well. Yet, as the author notes, the primary issue in implementing
these programs is determining the role and scope of exemptions. While medical
exemptions are accepted as necessary, Antommaria (2013) insists that conscientious
objections, both religious and nonreligious, should be allowed after a thorough evaluation
of their sincerity to ensure their allowance is not exploited. If the authors had utilized the
lengthy history of case law covering compulsory vaccination policies they may have seen
that including conscientious exemptions and evaluating their validity can be difficult,
administratively cumbersome, and potentially unconstitutional. Furthermore, vaccination
jurisprudence has suggested that nonmedical exemptions are not legally required to pass
constitutional muster due to the public health threat they address and their neutral
applicability.
In the case Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established a three-pronged
test that has been consistently used to evaluate the constitutionality of laws that are
challenged under the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from passing
a law respecting an establishment of religion (1971). To be deemed constitutional the
law (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with
religion (Sherr 1987). While this test was created in the context of religious exemptions,
the Court’s warning of the difficulties that arise with evaluating and establishing what
beliefs are “bona fide” or “sincerely held” seem applicable to all conscientious exemption
claims. Indeed, the complexity in evaluating exemption claims without endorsing certain
beliefs and not others, or inappropriately entangling the state in religion is why many
courts have found laws providing exemptions that make the type of evaluations that
Antommaria is calling for unnecessary at the very least.

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2523264

Antommaria (2013) proposes that the evaluative process distinguish between
sincere and insincere beliefs, and admits that this largely rests of the individual’s
credibility and will require the provision of sufficient evidence. As the court in Sherr v.
Northport-East Northport Union Free School District stated, this type of evaluation “in
essence puts the individual on trial for heresy” (1987). The court accepted that the state
may desire to limit improper evasion of immunization, but they were troubled by the
notion that some may be able to avoid the burden simply because the state deemed their
beliefs more worthy than another’s (Sherr 1987).
The court in LePage v. State Deptartment of Health found no statutory authority
to allow the state to judge the sincerity of a conscientious objection, while they made a
point to question the wisdom in doing so (2001). For example, they wondered whether a
belief that had not been held consistently over time should be deemed insincere and merit
a denial of an exemption request. After all, does a person need to be able to prove over a
sustained period of time a particular belief for it to be valid at that moment? If so, for
how long and what type of evidence would be deemed sufficient?
While Antommaria (2013) suggests mechanisms to establish sincerity, they do not
provide a definitive barometer for what is and is not in fact sincerely held beliefs. To be
sure, the difficulty in doing so is why many states have adopted requirements to simply
file the proper paperwork without evaluating the validity of the beliefs. Another likely
factor is the extreme administrative burden created by requiring each individual
exemption request be evaluated for sincerity. For hospitals, this would require setting up
their own tribunals to request and interpret evidence and testimony in determining the
validity of personal beliefs. In a hospital, where people need medical attention, it begs
the question of whether this is the best use of the resources that are likely to be demanded
to implement this requirement effectively.
As the court in LePage (2001) stated, to make this type of determination and
scrutinize personal beliefs, as Antommaria has suggested should be done, calls into
question the constitutionality of the provision. In fact, the assessment of sincerity, which
amounts to endorsing the beliefs of certain individuals and not others, has not been found
to be legally required and, in some courts, has been labeled unconstitutional. Throughout
the compulsory vaccination jurisprudence, courts consistently focus on the public’s
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health and the need and constitutionality to take measures to protect it. For example, in
the seminal case Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held compulsory
vaccinations constitutional because there is no “absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint” (1905). The Court
highlighted the appropriateness for the common good to outweigh individual liberties in
circumstances where the loss is minimal and the risk of harm is extremely small
(Jacobson 1905).
In Zucht v. King, the Supreme Court held that regulations that were reasonable
and created little risk of harm while promoting a legitimate state interest do not confer
arbitrary power, even if exercised by local officials (1922). Meanwhile, Boone v.
Boozeman established that as long as the immunization required had a real and
substantial relation to the protection of the public’s health, the regulation was valid
(2002). Little, if anything, is mentioned in these cases of the necessity to provide
exemptions for those who wish to avoid vaccination due to their personal beliefs, sincere
or otherwise. In fact, the Supreme Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts, stated that the right
to practice religion freely does not also grant one the right to expose the community to
communicable diseases (1944). Indeed, it seems unclear why even personal, nonreligious
beliefs would grant someone the right to expose others to infection.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi would most likely reject Antommaria’s
proposal for exemptions, just as it rejected the exemption policy in Brown v. Stone
(1979). In this case the court held that allowing exemptions did not avoid violations of
the First Amendment but instead violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Brown 1979). The court felt that the policy of allowing exemptions for
certain individuals discriminated against those who did not have objections and,
therefore, underwent the risks of vaccination for the benefit of themselves and others
(Brown 1979). This type of result conforms to prior doctrine that states that individuals
cannot avoid complying with valid and neutral laws of general applicability simply
because the conduct it requires does not comply with their religious beliefs (Employment
Division 1990).
After careful examination of the decades of compulsory vaccination doctrine
discussing exemptions for personal beliefs, the question is whether they are truly
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necessary and worth the difficulties and hindrances that are inherent with their use? The
desire to incorporate mechanisms for allowing conscientious objections, both religious
and nonreligious, is certainly laudable and understandable. It is difficult to grasp the
ethical justification for forcing individuals to succumb to medical procedures against
their beliefs, and is anathema to the individual liberties that play a primary role in the
foundation of this country’s Constitution. Yet, under this same umbrella of embracing
and protecting autonomy, courts have again and again maintained that exemptions are
unnecessary and likely unconstitutional themselves. While the authors claim to be
utilizing an ethical framework for public health, the courts’ focus on public health is what
has unfailingly led them to an opposing conclusion that exemptions are not required.
Ethics and the law are certainly different, and do not necessarily require the same
analysis. Yet, in a country where individual liberty and autonomy are held in such high
value and protected in almost any way possible, it seems worth mentioning the lack of
judicial requirements for exemptions and the reasoning behind it. The practicalities of
implementing the author’s suggested assessments of conscientious exemption requests
further suggest the necessity to heed the warnings of the judicial precedent. Truly
following the principles of public health would intimate that while individuals have rights
of autonomy and liberty, those rights cannot endanger the health and wellbeing of others
when there is so much to gain and so little risk of harm.
REFERENCES
1. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, An Ethical Analysis of Mandatory Influenza
Vaccination Health Care Personnel: Implementing Fairly and Balancing Benefits and
Burdens, American Journal of Bioethics (2013): 1–26.
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School District, 672 F.Supp. 81
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
4. LePage v. State Department of Health, 18 P.3d 1177 (Wyo. 2001).
5. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
6. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
7. Boone v. Boozeman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938 (ED Ark. 2002).
8. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
9. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979).
10. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

4

